FREE ESSAY ON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the untold story 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the untold story On August 6th 1945, the first Atomic Bomb,
"Little Boy," was dropped on Hiroshima, and three days later on August 9th 1945, the
second atomic bomb, "Fat Man," was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan's industrial capital. The
decision to use the Atomic Bomb against Japan was a poor one considering the damage, the
devastation, and the amount of people left dead, injured, or suffering the loss of a
family member or a friend, all for the sake of quickly ending the ongoing War. When the
Japanese had realized that they were the only ones left in the war, Germany their ally,
was already beaten out of the war and all efforts were now concentrated at them, the
Japanese began suing for a peaceful end to the war. Apart from the fact that Japan had
been suing for a peaceful end to the war, there were a number of alternative routes of
action that the Americans had at their fingertips, and could have taken advantage of at a
moment's notice, which could have possibly saved a lot of lives, both American and
Japanese. After analyzing the amount of damage and the amount of lives lost as a result
of the dropping of the Atomic Bomb, it becomes evident that dropping the bomb was not
worth a quick end to the war. Much of why Japanese surrender took so long to come through
reverts back to the Samurai Tradition in Japan. First, the Emperor didn't not intervene
in political affairs as he was considered to be above such petty human politics, and
second, the Japanese code of honor which puts death before dishonor. The Americans had
intercepted messages from the Foreign Minister Togo, to Ambassador Sato expressing the
desires of the Emperor for a peaceful end to the war, "[h]is Majesty the Emperor, mindful
of the fact that the present war daily brings greaterevil and sacrifice upon the peoples
of all belligerent powers, desires from his heart thatit may be quickly terminated"
(Alperovitz 23). The desire of the Emperor for an end to the war never came true until
both atomic bombs had been dropped on two of Japan's key industrial cities, as the
Emperor never formally expressed this desire. In the samurai tradition, the Emperor is
held at a God-like status and therefore, is considered above politics, so therefore he
never intervenes, and was never expected to intervene in political issues, his role was
to sanction decisions made by the Cabinet, whether he personally approved of them or not.
For this reason, the Emperor never expressed his desire for peace to the Cabinet; it was
an unprecedented act (Long). The retention of the Emperor was crucial to the surrender,
as the Japanese believed their Emperor was a god, the heart of the people and the culture
(Long). This Japanese belief is a part of a tradition that dates back to 660 B.C. when
the first Japanese Emperor, Jimmu, who according to legend was a descendant of the sun
god, Amaterasu. So there fore, according to the tradition, the emperor during this time,
Hirohito, was said to be a divine being. It is for this reason that the Japanese sued for
peace based on the "Atlantic Charter of 1941" that was drafted up by Roosevelt and
Churchill on August 4th, 1941. According to the "Atlantic Charter," every nation could
choose its own form of government, thus, if Japan were to surrender based on these terms,
they would be able to retain the emperor, their God (Alperovitz). However, when the
United States offered a peace agreement based on "Unconditional Surrender," the Japanese
refused this offer as no provisions had been made for their Emperor. As Leon V. Sigal
states, "…one point was clear to senior [United States] officials, regardless of
where they stood on war termination… the critical condition for Japanese surrender
was the assurance that the throne would be preserved" (Alperovitz 31). It turns out that
the unconditional surrender clause of the peace agreement was the major factor that
hindered Japanese surrender at this point in the war. According to the surrender
agreement, "the authority that deceived the people into embarking on world conquest must
be eliminated from Japan" (Long). To the Japanese this sounded like a threat being made
to their Emperor. This to the Japanese would almost be like the crucifixion of Jesus in
the Christian faith. The Japanese feared that if they surrendered based on these terms,
first of all, they would loose their Emperor, and second, it sounds as if the Emperor
would be treated as a war criminal. The Japanese officials and people were not willing to
take such a risk. According to British Major General Sir Hastings Ismay in his memoirs,
"…[I]f they [Japanese] were given to think that a rigid interpretation would be
placed on the term 'unconditional surrender,' and that their Emperor would be treated as
a war criminal, every man, woman, and child would fight until doomsday. If on the other
hand, the terms of surrender were phrased in such a way as to appear to preserve the
right of their Emperor to order them to lay down their arms, they would have done so
without a moment's hesitation" (Alperovitz 370). The Japanese people had such a passion
for their Emperor that if there was the slightest hint that he was going to be treated
like a common war criminal, the Japanese people, man, woman, and children would rather
fight to the death before they allow such a thing to take place. Even after the Atomic
Bomb had been dropped on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a vote in the Japanese government
still came up deadlocked between the hawks and the doves. The doves wanted to surrender
as they realized that Japan only faced more destruction if they continued the fighting.
The hawks were in favor of continuing the war to the end, regardless of material damage
to Japan. In the Samurai tradition, a part of the honor code is that "hopelessness in a
battle is no reason to surrender" (Long), so the Japanese were not concerned about
surrendering merely because the situation looked hopeless. The major concern for the
Japanese military was the loss of honor; they had a code of "death before dishonor"
(Long). So therefore, a Japanese soldier would prefer death to surrendering, for to
surrender is to give up one's honor. Apart from the fact that the Japanese had long
wanted a peaceful end to the war, there were a number of alternatives that the Americans
could have taken, as opposed to dropping the atomic bomb. The Americans had a superior
air force, a superior navy, and a superior army. Along with the superiority of the
American forces, Japan was decimated; the American forces had defeated Japan's air force,
navy, and army. The Japanese were completely cut off from the rest of the world, as
Robert Butow said, "…the scales of the war had been tipped so steeply against the
Japanese that no counterweight at their disposal could have balanced them. Germany, which
for the Japanese had been a seemingly invincible first line of defense, was facing
inevitable destruction; the defense perimeter that the Japanese had created far out
beyond their island base had been cracked and deeply penetrated; worst of all, Japan's
military potential was dropping rapidly with her industrial capacity, as American
submarines and planes cut the last of her economic lifelines to the outside world and
great aerial armadas began the methodical destruction of her cities" (Alperovitz 17). The
simplest alternative that the Americans could have taken would have been to sustain the
blockade that had already been in place. While being bombarded from the sky, a naval
blockade strangled Japan's ability to import oil and other vital minerals, and its
ability to produce war materials (Long). Due to the effective air, sea, and land blockade
that was in progress, Japan was unable to "…maintain their industry, maintain their
shipbuilding, and carry on their commercial life…"(Alp 327). Also, there was a
heavy destruction of machinery and equipment, which were impossible to replace because of
the blockade. Japan was defeated from all possible angles, according to Captain Robert
Dornin, "We had then on their knees…"(Alp 329). Japan was devastated, all that the
American forces had to do was to hold out the blockade, Dornin states, "…why not
wait for three or four months and then if they didn't [surrender], drop the [atomic]
bomb"(Alp 329). In the course of time, the effective naval blockade would have starved
the Japanese into submission through a lack of oil, rice, medicine, and other essential
materials, according to Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Naval Operations, Ernest King. The
Allied forces were defeating Japan in every way possible. The fall of Saipan in early
July of 1944 and of Tinian and Guam one month later, provided base which brought the
homeland into much closer range for B-29 conventional bombings. In September, Lieutenant
General George C. Kenney, Commander of the Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, was able
to tell General "Hap" Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces: "the situation is
developing rapidly and there are trends which indicate that the Jap is not going to last
much longer. His sea power is so badly depleted that it is no match for any one of
several task forces we could put into action. His air power is in a bad way. He has a lot
or airplanes- probably more than he had a year ago- but he has lost his elements, flight,
squadron and group leaders and his hastily trained replacements haven't the skill or
ability or combat knowledge to compete with us…. Without the support of his sea
power and air power, his land forces cannot do anything except hold out in isolated
beleaguered spots all over the map until bombs, bullets, disease, or starvation killed
them off…" The Russians, under Stalin, gave notice that it would not renew its
existing Neutral Pact with Japan and would enter the war on the Allied side. So another
alternative could have been to await the Russian entry into the war as an American ally.
According to the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, the entry of Russia
into the war as an American ally would have caused Japan to capitulate. In 1945,
Eisenhower states, "…we three, Britain with her mighty fleet, America with the
strongest air force, and Russia with the strongest land force on the continent…"
could have brought an end to the war (Alp 353). Even without the Russians entering the
war, and without the atomic bomb being used, Japan could have been defeated, according to
Major General Curtis E. Lemay, "[t]he war would have been over in weeks without the
Russians entering and without the atomic bomb"(Alp 334). Even if the atomic had to be
used, the Japanese should have received some warning prior to it's use, they should have
been given the chance to see the power of the bomb before it was dropped on them.
According to Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy, and member of the interim
Committee, "…before the bomb is used against Japan, Japan should have some
preliminary warning for say two to three days in advance of use"(Bard). The Japanese
should have been given some warning; the atomic bomb took them by surprise. A
demonstration of some sort should have been conducted to give the Japanese a chance to
see the destructive power of the atomic bomb before it was used on their country. General
Spaatz stated, "… if we were going to drop the atomic bomb, drop it on the
outskirts - say in Tokyo Bay - so that the effects would not be as devastating to the
city and the people"(Alp 345) . Admiral L. Lewis Strauss, special assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy also proposed that a demonstration be done, "…over an area
accessible to the Japanese observers, and where its effects would be dramatic enough to
prove to the Japanese that at any given moment the U.S. could destroy any Japanese
city"(Alp 333). Evidently, all the possible alternatives to using the atomic bomb,
probably the most dangerous, most destructive weapon in the history of the world, were
not properly investigated. Gar Alperovitz argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff never
formally studied the decision, nor did they carry out the usual extensive staff work and
evaluation of alternative measures. The American usage of the atomic bomb was
irresponsible. The lives lost, the injuries inflicted, and the damages all reflect the
devastating power of the atomic bomb, of which the Americans knew about. Tests conducted
by the Manhattan Engineer District showed the effects of the atomic bomb when detonated
on a target. Tests were done on a site 29 kilometers by 39 kilometer bombing range in the
New Mexican desert. A small bomb was detonated on a 100 feet tall tower. The tower was
blown to pieces; the detonation left an impression that was 2.9 meters deep and 335 meter
wide (Maag & Rohrer). The Manhattan Engineers had a fairly good idea as to what kind of
damage a full size atomic bomb would incur on the Japanese, but yet the bomb was still
used. Though argued that the atomic bomb saved many American lives, it took a lot of
innocent Japanese lives, mostly women and children. In Hiroshima, 66 thousand people were
killed, and 69 thousand were injured, totally casualties were approximately a half of the
population of Hiroshima. In Nagasaki, 39 thousand people were killed, and 25 thousand
were injured. Most of the casualties due to the dropping of the atomic bomb were innocent
women and children. Many have argued that this was the most barbaric to ever take place,
"…one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-combatants in all history"
(Alp 352) according to Admiral William D. Leahy, who also made it clear that "…war
is not to be waged on women and children" (Alp 326). Leahy claims that the use of the
bomb adopted the ethical standards common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. Apart from
the thousands of Japanese lives that were taken, the bomb also fell on home, killing
approximately 23 or more American prisoners of war held in Japanese prisons. Over 1000
Japanese-Americans were killed as a result of the dropping of the atomic bomb (Long). The
ripping pressure caused by the detonation of the atomic bomb surged through the lands,
and ripped through buildings and the bodies of people. Those whom the immediate effects
of the bomb didn't kill, were left injured and wishing they were dead. Most injuries
resulted from the radioactive heat emitted by the detonated bomb, and other injuries were
results of falling buildings or flying debris. Numerous people were reported to have
suffered fire related burns; mostly "flash" burns, caused by the instantaneous radiation
of heat and light, similar to excessive exposure to x-rays. Others were injured by the
falling buildings, and the flying debris caused by the pressure of the waves of energy
that surged through the area. Pressure waves swept through the area, wiping out just
about everything in a 1-mile radius. In Hiroshima, the bomb destroyed everything within 4
square miles and in Nagasaki; it destroyed everything within 1.5 square miles. In
Nagasaki, the damages cost were smaller than in Hiroshima because of the strategic
position of Nagasaki. It is located between two mountains, and therefore these mountains
retarded the effects of the bomb. Evidently, the atomic bomb is an extremely powerful
weapon; it was described as having more power than 20 thousand tons of T.N.T. It is said
to have had more blast power than that of the "British Grand Slam," the largest bomb ever
used up until that time (Manhattan Engineer District). In-fact, the bomb was so powerful
that the smoke and flames were recorded to have reached a height of 40 thousand feet
within eight minutes of detonation. Despite the fact that there are a number of logical
and ethical reasons why the use of the atomic bomb is looked down on, there are still
people, with valid reasons as to why the atomic bomb was necessary. The most common
reason advocating the use of the atomic bomb is based on the argument that it saved
American lives. Secretary of War Stimson states that the atomic bomb "…was going to
be used because it would save hundreds of thousands of American lives" (Alperovitz 354).
According to Lemay, "[I]f a nuclear weapon shortened the war by only a week, probably it
saved more lives than were taken by that single glare of heat and radiation" (Alperovitz
334). Lemay maintains, "the atomic bomb probably saved three million Japanese lives and
perhaps a million American casualties" (Alperovitz 341). The bomb probably did save
American lives, but who knows how many; it could have saved anywhere from one to one
thousand American lives, no one knows how many. What is known however is that the bomb
not only took thousands of Japanese lives, it also took approximately 23 or more lives of
American prisoners of war being held in Hiroshima and over one thousand Japanese-American
lives. Initially, when targets were being selected for bombing, there were four different
cities selected, but only two bombs produced. Marshal states, "when we got the bombs, we
had to use them in the best possible way to save American lives…" there were only
two bombs and "…the situation demanded shock action" (Alperovitz 361). The truth
about the bomb is that it cost too much money to make, approximately ten million dollars
to produce one bomb. Plutonium, the most crucial part of the atomic bomb was hard to come
by. Uranium-235 was scarce at this time, and plutonium was a by-product of uranium. Not
only was the uranium to produce the plutonium hard to come by, it was also hard to
process. The plutonium was hard to process and could not be produced in large amounts; it
had to be produced in small quantities ( Maag & Rohrer). Marshall argues that exploding a
bomb over the sea has never been tested and its behavior was unpredictable. No one knew
how the atomic bomb would behave, it could be a dud, in which case the Japanese would
laugh in the faces of the Americans, or it could get out of control. The truth about the
situation is that there was only enough plutonium to produce two bombs, and the Americans
could not afford to squander one bomb, which costs ten millions to produce, on a
demonstration. There is really no way the Americans could have known what the Japanese
would have done. No one knew for sure what would have happened had the bomb not been
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, only assumptions have been made about what would have
happened. For all anyone at all knew, the Japanese could have kept on fighting until the
last Japanese was killed. Defending the decision to use the atomic bomb, Marshall states,
"we had to assume that a force of 2.5 million Japanese would fight to the death…"
kind of like how they did on the small islands that the U.S. troops attacked, "we figured
that in their homeland, they would fight even harder" (Alperovitz 361). What could have
possibly led Marshall to believe this is the fact that the Japanese were very
resourceful. After they were blocked in, and food lines were blocked, the Japanese
started to promote the substitution of acorns for rice, over one hundred and fifty
millions acorns were processed for distribution across Japan as a rice substitute. Not
only that, but the Japanese also discovered that the pine tree root could be processed
for a small quantity of oil, so the Japanese started to vigorously cut down pine trees
for processing. As far as the issue of awaiting the entry of the Russians into the war as
an Allied force, the Americans were cautious. The Russian option was somewhat overlooked
because of the fear of communist influence in Asia. The Allies did not really wish to
exercise the option of ending the war with a Soviet attack if they could avoid doing so,
only as the last possibly means (Alperovitz 84). The Americans were fearful that the
Russian influence would possibly lead to widespread communism in Asia. Despite the
arguments put forth by Marshal and many others who advocated the use of the atomic bomb
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the author of this paper still maintains that the use of the
atomic as a quick end to the war was a poor choice considering the lives lost, the people
killed, and the amount of damages that it caused. Close to half the population of the
area that the bomb was dropped on was completely and totally wiped out. Not only did the
atomic bomb kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people, but it also devastated an
entire country. Due to the fact that the bomb was dropped on Japan's two industrial
cities, Japan went into a total economic and traditional decline. Japan's economy was
devastated, and due to the fact that the Americans had to step in and help the Japanese
economy to build back up, most of the American values and traditions were incorporated
into the Japanese culture. The Americans had good intentions when they decided to use the
atomic bomb, they merely wanted to stop the bloodshed and did what they thought was
possibly best. 
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