FREE ESSAY ON CRISIS IN KOSOVO

CRISIS IN KOSOVO

The tension in Kosovo has existed for centuries, dating back as far as 1389 when Serbs
lost an epic battle to the Ottoman Turks in Kosovo. Not until 1912, more than 500 years
later did the Serbs regain control when Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the
conclusion of World War II, as an absolute monarchy under the name Yugoslavia, the
country became a communist republic. Autonomy was granted to Kosovo in 1974 in a revised
constitution. Kosovo, although a Serbian province, was largely occupied by ethnic
Albanians who established Albanian-language schools and institutions. In 1987, Slobodan
Milosevic rose to power in Yugoslavia, riding the wave of Serbian nationalism with his
promises of a "Greater Serbia." Escalating tensions between the Serbs and the ethnic
Albanians and the fear of secession prompted Milosevic to strip Kosovo, though 90 percent
Albanian, of it's autonomy and army troops and police were deployed in battle strength to
maintain order. Kosovo's Albanian majority voted in 1992 to secede from Yugoslavia,
voicing a desire to merge with Albania. President Bush warned Serbs that the United
States would use force if the Serbs attacked Kosovo. 
In 1997, The Kosovo Liberation Army began killing Serb policemen and others supporters of
the Serbs. The conflict turned into a guerilla war after Milosevic sent troops into the
areas controlled by the Kosovo Liberation Army and killed 80 Kosovars. Shortly after,
talks were held for the first time advocating a peaceful path to independence for Kosovo,
but the Albanian side boycotted further meetings. Later, the United Nations Security
Council called for an immediate cease-fire and political negotiations, but with little
support from either side. NATO allies then authorized airstrikes against Serb military
targets, but were not prompted to take action because Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops
and accept unarmed international monitors. Following a number of failed peace talks NATO
launched airstrikes on March 24th of this year. 
The involvement of NATO in this conflict is unprecedented and raises questions about why
action was not taken under the auspices of the United Nations rather than NATO. The
United Nations has not voted on the use of force against Yugoslavia because both Russia
and China would almost certainly veto military action. Russia has a traditional alliance
with the Serbs, while China (particularly because of their own political situation and
human rights violations) opposes any international intervention in the domestic affairs
of sovereign nations like Yugoslavia. The crisis in Kosovo is of particular interest to
Russia because it is ultimately a test of the relative weights of sovereignty and the
right to self-determination. As the outlying areas of Russia are home to a myriad of
ethnic groups, the settlement of the situation in Kosovo will provide a precedent (albeit
perhaps a reluctant one) to which future conflicts might be resolved. Once the
governments of the NATO countries decided it was necessary to intervene in Kosovo, they
acted without taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council because of the
certain resistance of China and Russia. 
The United States and NATO objectives are to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace
that prevents further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the
Kosovar people. The United States and NATO have three strong interests at stake in the
Kosovo conflict: averting a humanitarian catastrophe; preserving stability in a key part
of Europe; and maintaining the credibility of NATO. 
The Serbian's sustained and accelerating repression in Kosovo is creating a humanitarian
crisis of a staggering dimension. Serb forces have killed hundreds of ethnic Albanians in
an effort Serbs call "ethnic cleansing", and displaced an estimated 250,000 by burning
and looting their homes. Currently 40,000 Serbian police and military troops are
positioned in and around Kosovo poised for a military offensive. 
The instability in Kosovo directly threatens peace in the Balkans and the stability of
Europe, which could have viable consequences to the United States as well as the rest of
the world. There is no natural boundary to this violence; World War I began in this same
tinderbox. If actions are not taken now to stop the conflict, it will spread and both the
cost and the risk will increase substantially. Continued fighting in Kosovo has the
potential to re-ignite chaos in Albania and destabilize Macedonia. In addition the
conflict could exacerbate rivalries between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies. Greece
and Turkey have different ethnic, religious, and political allegiances to the peoples
living in Kosovo and the nations surrounding Yugoslavia. The conflict could draw those
countries in to protect their own national interests. Lastly, so many displaced people
creates a breeding ground for international criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists. 
Perhaps the most decisive motive behind NATO's involvement in Kosovo is the certain risk
of losing credibility through inaction. NATO's credible threat of force was solely
responsible in originally obtaining Milosevic's agreement to a cease-fire and the
establishment of OSCE and NATO verification regimes. This agreement enabled hundreds of
thousands of Kosovars to come down from the hills and temporarily return to their homes.
As of today, Milosevic has not come into compliance with the October agreements and his
repression continues. NATO warned Milosevic that it would respond under such
circumstances. Given the situation, action is required on the part of NATO to ensure it's
continued credibility. 
The preference of NATO has been to achieve these objectives through peaceful means. The
international community has been actively seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict
through diplomacy. The agreement produced at the Rambouillet and Paris talks keeps Kosovo
in Serbia, but gives Kosovars the self-government they deserve, however Milosevic has
refused to sign the agreement. Milosevic has rejected all efforts to achieve a peaceful
solution. 
Milosevic has been out of compliance with the solemn commitments to NATO and OSCE since
October. Serb forces have consistently and blatantly violated the cease-fire, moved
troops and police out of garrison in violation of his commitments, refused to cooperate
with and continued to impede the work of the Kosovo Verification Mission and
international relief agencies, and committed atrocities such as the Racak massacre in
mid-January.
NATO has outlined three clear objectives in the Kosovo conflict. NATO intends to
demonstrate its seriousness of purpose in order to make clear to Milosevic the imperative
of reversing course. It also must deter Milosevic from launching an all-out offensive
against helpless civilians. Finally, to seriously damage Milosevic's military capability
to take repressive action against Kosovars. 
What is to be done to reconcile both the right to Yugoslav territorial integrity and the
right to self-determination on the part of the Kosovars? There will need to be two policy
prescriptions. Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic has warned the United States and its
allies that any initiation of a ground war would result in a conflict that would make
Vietnam look like nothing. But the situation would become very different to the one in
Southeast Asia. After an extensive air campaign, new conditions provide an end to NATO
air strikes from the outset, not completion of Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo. From there
on in, armed NATO peacekeepers will administer the safe return of Kosovar refugees. In
this sense, and with the knowledge of human rights violations, the international
community will justly revoke Yugoslavia's sovereignty. The second policy prescription is
the most difficult. Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters must be removed from office and
new, democratic institutions put in place to ensure both the maintenance of the Yugoslav
state and the wider participation and self-determination of Kosovars. The second policy
prescription's success relies upon the Serbian people. A vocal minority will be hateful
of the measure. It will be a matter of harnessing the anti-Milosevic sentiments present
during the protests of 1991 and 1997 to remove him from office. He will not retire
without a struggle. His removal by his own constituents proves the key component to the
success of new democratic institutions.
Democratic institutions, in which the Kosovars, Montenegrins, and Serbians alike may be
represented, seem the best (though not the perfect) solution to opposing sovereignty and
self-determination rights. Much as in Bosnia, a peacekeeping force will be required for
years to attempt to fortify the new constitutional government against what amounts to
over 600 years of distrust between the Serbian and Kosovar parties. This solution is
ideal in the respect that it is a compromise attractive to the international community.
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia will be maintained. A medium for
some safe exercise of self-determination rights will be provided. No clear preference
will be shown between the two, and international law can continue to operate
case-by-case.