FREE ESSAY ON CRIME

CRIME

In this paper the exciting criminal phenomenon known as white-collar crime will be
discussed. Corporate Crime and Computer Crime will be discussed in detail. Crime
preventative agencies such as the NCPC (National Crime Prevention Council) will also be
researched.
White Collar Crime
The late Professor Edwin Sutherland coined the term white-collar crime about 1941.
Sutherland defined white-collar crime as a crime committed by a person of respectability
and high social status in the course of his occupation (Siegel 337)
White-collar crime includes, by way of example, such acts as promulgating false or
misleading advertising, illegal exploitation of employees, mislabeling of goods,
violation of weights and measures statutes, conspiring to fix prices, evading corporate
taxes, computer crimes, and so on. 
White-collar crime is most distinctively defined in terms of attitudes toward those who
commit it. These crimes are punishable by law, however it is generally regarded by the
courts and by sections of the general public as much less reprehensible than crimes
usually punished by the courts. The other types of crime are blue-collar offenses, which
are predominately crimes of the under-privileged. White-collar crimes are punished far
less harshly than blue-collar crimes, which shows societies attitudes towards the two
sections of society. White-collar crime is attractive to criminals because it brings
material rewards with little or no loss of status. (Taft & England 201)
For some, white-collar crime is not viewed as a crime at all, because of its non-violent
nature. Violent crime has an immediate and observable impact on its victim which raises
the ire of the public, whereas white-collar crime frequently goes undetected or is viewed
as a bending of the rules. Yet white-collar crime can create the greater havoc. The
victim of an assault will recover; however, the impact of a fraud can last a lifetime.
This is especially true when the elderly are victimized, as they have little or no hope
of re-establishing themselves in financial terms. Contrary to the popular belief,
white-collar criminals are thieves and the methods used to conceal their offenses are
both artful and ingenious. Concealment of the crime is always an objective of the
offender, and it becomes an element of the crime itself. Because it is an artful form of
deceit, which is skillfully disguised, the investigation itself is often long and
laborious as far as proving criminal intent is concerned. The offence itself may be
disguised in a maze of legitimate transactions, which are quite proper if viewed in
isolation; however, the cumulative effect is the commission of a criminal offence. From
the standpoint of the criminal, the ideal white- collar crime is one that will never be
recognized or detected as a criminal act. (Radzinowicz 325-335)
Corporate Crime
Corporate crime is the type of crime that is engaged in by individuals and groups of
individuals who become involved in criminal conspiracies designed to improve the market
share or profitability of their corporations. ( Siegel 338)
Corporations are legal entities, which can be and are subjected to criminal processes.
There is today little restriction on the range of crimes for which corporations may be
held responsible, though a corporation cannot be imprisoned. The most controversial issue
in regard to the study of corporate crime revolves around the question of whether
corporate crime is really crime. Corporate officials, politicians, and many
criminologists object to the criminological study of corporate criminality on the
strictest sense of the word. The conventional and strictly legal definition of crime is
that it is an act, which violates the criminal law and is thereby punishable by a
criminal court. From this perspective a criminal is one who has been convicted in a
criminal court. Given these widely accepted notions of crime and criminals, it is argued
that what is called corporate crime is not really crime and should not be considered as
such by either the public or criminologists. (Hochstedler 22)
It does appear that now in recent times society has had a growing concern about
white-collar and corporate crime. Studies have indicated that the public now judges
white-collar criminality to be more serious than it had been in the past, people now have
lost confidence in the people running major companies, and most American corporate
executives are believed to be dishonest. The public's concern with corporate crime has
grown recently, but has been evident for several years. I will use one of the most
memorable corporate crime cases in history; The Ford Pinto Case to prove my statement.
(Cullen/Maakestad/Cavender 43)
The product liability lawsuit and appeal titled Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company is a case
in point and ought to be read by everyone. Grimshaw is an example of the type of thing
that can happen when an industry insolates itself from competition. The Pinto affair has
very important lessons for us all. Its story can teach us much about the power of huge
corporations and what corporations can do when they face no real competition. It
carries an important lesson about how the minds of those who run the world's colossal
corporations work. 
In November of 1971 the Grays purchased a new 1972 Pinto hatchback manufactured by Ford
in October of 1971. The Grays had trouble with the car from the
outset. During the first few months of ownership, they had to return the car to the
dealer for repairs a number of times. Their car problems included excessive gas and oil
consumption, down shifting of the automatic transmission, lack of power, and occasional
stalling. It was later learned that the stalling and excessive fuel consumption were
caused by a heavy carburetor float.
On May 28, Mrs. Gray, accompanied by 13-year-old Richard Grimshaw, set out in the Pinto
from Anaheim for Barstow to meet Mr. Gray. The Pinto was then six months old and had been
driven approximately 3,000 miles. Mrs. Gray stopped in San Bernardino for gasoline, got
back onto the freeway (Interstate 15) and proceeded toward her destination at 60 - 65
miles per hour. As she approached the Route 30 off-ramp where traffic was congested, she
moved from the outer fast lane to the middle lane of the freeway. Shortly after this lane
change, the Pinto suddenly stalled and coasted to a halt in the middle lane. It was later
established that the carburetor float had become so saturated with gasoline that it
suddenly sank, opening the float chamber and causing the engine to flood and stall. A car
traveling immediately behind the Pinto was able to swerve and pass it but the driver of a
1962 Ford Galaxie was unable to avoid colliding with the Pinto. The Galaxie had been
traveling from 50 to 55 miles per hour but before the impact had been braked to a speed
of 28 to 37 miles per hour.
At the moment of impact, the Pinto caught fire and its interior was engulfed in flames.
According to the plaintiff's expert, the impact of the Galaxie had driven the Pinto's gas
tank forward and caused it to be punctured by the flange or one of the bolts on the
differential housing so that fuel sprayed from the punctured tank and entered the
passenger compartment through gaps resulting from the separation of the rear wheel well
sections from the floor pan. By the time the Pinto came to rest after the collision, both
occupants had sustained serious burns. When they emerged from the vehicle, their clothing
was almost completely burned off. Mrs. Gray died a few days later of congestive heart
failure as a result of the burns. Grimshaw managed to survive but only through heroic
medical measures. He has undergone numerous and extensive surgeries and skin grafts and
was expected to have to undergo additional surgeries over the next 10 years. He lost
portions of several fingers on his left hand and portions of his left ear,
while his face required many skin grafts from various portions of his body. This graphic
account of these events is needed to grasp the full impact of this tragic situation which
could have been avoided by Ford for very minimal cost. Each Pinto could have been
repaired for $4-$8 a piece. Management knew of these defects but still decided to produce
and release the Pinto to the public.
The idea for the Pinto, as has been noted, was conceived by Mr. Iacocco [sic], the
Executive Vice President of Ford. The feasibility study was conducted under the
supervision of Mr. Robert Alexander, Vice President of Car Engineering. Ford's
Product Planning Committee, whose members included Mr. Iacocca, Mr. Robert Alexander, and
Mr. Harold MacDonald, Ford's Group Vice President of Car Engineering, approved the
Pinto's concept and made the decision to go forward with the project. Harley Copp, a
former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash testing program, testified that
the highest level of Ford's management made the decision to go forward with the
production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank was vulnerable to
puncture at low rear impact speeds creating a significant risk of death or injury from
fire and knowing that fixes were feasible at nominal cost. He testified that management's
decision was based on the cost savings, which would inure from omitting the fixes. This
was the corporation's outright trade of human life for profit. The jury in this case
brought in a verdict for the plaintiffs in excess of $128 million of which $125 million
were punitive damages.
There is another very important point to be made by this case. Ford knew that the Pinto
was going to kill or burn people because of its design, but, because of the cost savings
which would inure from omitting the fixes, Ford decided to let it go. Consider carefully
exactly what Ford Motor Company was doing here. One could argue that Ford was conducting
cost-benefit analysis. To the Ford executives, the benefits were clear, calculable, and
immediately available. Ford would save a few dollars on each Pinto manufactured. The
costs would accrue in the future and would not be paid by Ford. Unfortunately, the costs
were the lives and permanent injuries of nameless and faceless future consumers. The
Pinto would appear to be a prime example of laying off costs. The suffering, the
destroyed lives and families apparently were of minor consideration in the calculations
when Ford performed the cost-benefit analysis.
Corporate crime has also been linked to political leaders in this country. Corporate
crime is a crime of power and profit for the offenders. Large and powerful corporations
who have the support of prominent political leaders can be difficult to prosecute in
corporate crime cases. 
At the Progress & Freedom Foundation conference held at the Mayflower Hotel in
Washington, D.C., Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) was asked why he spent
so much time addressing the issue of street crime and violence, while ignoring the issue
of corporate crime and violence. Gingrich answered, If I went around the country and
said, 'Vote for us and there will be no more white-collar fraud,' the average voter will
say, 'I don't think he gets it.' But corporate crime is more than just white-collar
fraud. And one reason that Gingrich doesn't address the issue of corporate crime might be
because one of the corporations that has brought him to power is Southwire Co. of
Carrollton, Georgia. Southwire has close ties to Gingrich, it dominates the political
economy of Carroll County, where Gingrich's political career was launched, and it is a
corporation with a criminal record. Individuals affiliated with Southwire Co., including
its chief executive officer, Roy Richards, and its president, James Richards, have
donated more than $18,000 to Gingrich's campaigns for Congress during the past ten years.
According to the Los Angeles Times, James Richards has also donated 80,200 to GOPAC, the
political action committee spearhearded by Gingrich. 
Computer Crime
Computer technology has introduced new factors concerning the types of perpetrators, the
forms of assets threatened, and embezzlement methods. ( Radzinowicz 357) Computer crimes
generally fall into five categories: 1) theft of services 2) use of computer data for
personal gain 3) unauthorized use of computers employed for various types of financial
processing 4) property theft by computer 5) placing viruses to destroy data. (Siegel
353)
The terms computer misuse and computer abuse are also used frequently, but they have
significantly different implications. Criminal law recognizes the concepts of unlawful or
fraudulent intent and of claim of right; thus, any criminal laws that relate to computer
crime would need to distinguish between accidental misuse of a computer system, negligent
misuse of a computer system and intended, unauthorized access to or misuse of a computer
system, amounting to computer abuse. Annoying behavior must be distinguished from
criminal behavior in law. 
History has shown that a broad range of persons commits computer crime: students,
amateurs, terrorists and members of organized crime groups. What distinguishes them is
the nature of the crime committed. The individual who accesses a computer system without
further criminal intent is much different from the employee of a financial institution
who skims funds from customer accounts. The typical skill level of the computer criminal
is a topic of controversy. Some claim that skill level is not an indicator of a computer
criminal, while others claim that potential computer criminals are bright, eager, highly
motivated subjects willing to accept a technological challenge, characteristics that are
also highly desirable in an employee in the data-processing field.
According to a number of studies, however, employees represent the largest threat, and
indeed computer crime has often been referred to as an insider crime. One study estimated
that 90 per cent of economic computer crimes were committed by
employees of the victimized companies. A recent survey in North America and Europe
indicated that 73 per cent of the risk to computer security was attributable to internal
sources and only 23 per cent to external criminal activity.
The American Bar Association conducted a survey in 1987: of 300 corporations and
government agencies, 72 claimed to have been the victim of computer-related crime in the
12-month period prior to the survey, sustaining losses estimated to range from $ 145
million to $ 730 million. In 1991, a survey of security incidents involving
computer-related crime was conducted at 3,000 Virtual Address Extension (VAX) sites in
Canada, Europe and the United States of America. Seventy-two per cent of the respondents
said that a security incident had occurred within the previous 12-month period; 43 per
cent indicated that the security incident they had sustained had been a criminal offence.
A further 8 per cent were uncertain whether they had sustained
a security incident. Similar surveys conducted around the world report significant and
widespread abuse and loss. 
Computer criminals have gained notoriety in the media and appear to have gained more
social acceptability than traditional criminals. The suggestion that the computer
criminal is a less harmful individual, however, ignores the obvious. The current threat
is real. The future threat will be directly determined by the advances made in computer
technology. 
Although it is difficult to quantify the scope of the computer crime problem, public
reports have estimated that computer crime costs us between five hundred million and ten
billion dollars per year. The Computer Security Institute has surveyed 428 information
security specialists in Fortune 500 companies; 42% of the respondents indicated that
there was an unauthorized use of their computer systems in the last year.
Only a small portion of computer crimes come to the attention of the law enforcement
authorities. While it is possible to give an accurate description of the various types of
computer offences committed, it has proved difficult to give an accurate, reliable
overview of the extent of losses and the actual number of criminal offences.
At its Colloquium on Computer Crimes and Other Crimes against Information Technology,
held at Wurzburg, Germany, from 5 to 8 October 1992, AIDP released a report on computer
crime based on reports of its member countries that estimated that only 5 per cent of
computer crime was reported to law enforcement authorities.
Law enforcement officials indicate from their experience that recorded computer crime
statistics do not represent the actual number of offences; the term dark figure, used by
criminologists to refer to unreported crime, has been applied to undiscovered computer
crimes. The invisibility of computer crimes is based on several factors. First,
sophisticated technology, that is, the immense, compact storage capacity of the computer
and the speed with which computers function, ensures that computer crime is very
difficult to detect. In contrast to most traditional areas of crime, unknowing victims
are often informed after the fact by law enforcement officials that they have sustained a
computer crime. Secondly, investigating officials often do not have sufficient training
to deal with problems in the complex environment of data processing. Thirdly, many
victims do not have a contingency plan for responding to incidents of computer crime, and
they may even fail to acknowledge that a security problem exists.
The dynamic nature of computer technology, compounded by specific considerations and
complications in applying traditional laws to this new technology, dictate that the law
enforcement, legal and judicial communities must develop new skills to be able to respond
adequately to the challenge presented by computer crime. The growing sophistication of
telecommunications systems and the high level of expertise of many system operators
complicate significantly the task of regulatory and legal intervention by law enforcement
agencies. If the law enforcement community is expected to deal with the problem of
computer crime, adequate training sessions must be implemented.
To address computer crime, most police departments are allocating a greater proportion of
resources to their economic or fraud investigation divisions, since many types of
computer crime occur in the course of business transactions or affect financial assets.
Accordingly, it is important for investigators to know about business transactions and
about the use of computer in business. The ideal situation is to have investigators with
not only solid criminal investigation backgrounds but also supplementary technical
knowledge. This is similar to the traditional approach, where many police forces ensure
that their fraud investigators, although not necessarily accountants, possess a thorough
understanding of financial and business record keeping. 
Preventative Agencies
In the late 1970s, the prevailing public attitude was you can't do anything about crime.
A varied group of individuals - government policy makers, law
enforcement, business, labor leaders - disagreed. This group founded the National
Citizens' Crime Prevention Campaign featuring McGruff the Crime Dog, our
nation's symbol for crime prevention.
In 1977, FBI Director Clarence Kelley and his assistant, John Coleman, went to
The Advertising Council with a proposal for a crime prevention public service advertising
campaign. The Ad Council tabled the plan, but it sparked the interest of
Leo Perlis, Director of the AFL-CIO's Community Services Division and a
member of The Ad Council's public policy committee. Contact was made with the
officials in the U.S. Department of Justice's Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA), and with Carl M. Loeb, Jr. - a businessman and activist
with a longstanding interest in reforming the criminal justice system and a board
member of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
In late 1977, LEAA, the FBI, and the AFL-CIO formed a small planning group
and included the National Sheriffs' Association and the International Association of
Chiefs of Police. Subsequently, two advisory bodies from 19 national agencies
were formed that would become the nucleus of the Crime Prevention Coalition,
now 136 member organizations strong.
By 1982, the McGruff Public Service Advertising Campaign was an
acknowledged success - in just two years McGruff's Take A Bite Out Of Crime,
slogan was known by over half the population and his advice heeded by a
substantial portion of that audience. To help build a focus on prevention, the
original partners in the Campaign decided to create a new home for McGruff in an
agency whose sole mission was the prevention of crime.
With seed funding from the federal government and supported by the leadership
and financial contribution of Carl M. Loeb, Jr., the National Crime Prevention
Council was created as a nonprofit organization to manage the McGruff Campaign
and coordinate activities of the Crime Prevention Coalition. Mr. Loeb served as
Chairman of the Board until his death in 1985. John A. Calhoun, formerly U.S.
Commissioner of the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families, was
selected as NCPC's first executive director. Individuals who had been working on
the Campaign became the core staff of the newly formed NCPC.
Through the hard work and dedication of people around the country, NCPC has
evolved into the nation's resource for crime prevention. Aside from coordinating
the efforts of the McGruff Campaign, NCPC provides comprehensive crime
prevention technical assistance and training to communities throughout the United
States; develops and implements highly-acclaimed and innovative youth
development programs; runs pathbreaking demonstration programs such as the
10-city Community Responses to Drug Abuse and the seven-city Texas City
Action Plan To Prevent Crime; disseminates information on effective crime
prevention practices to thousands of individuals and organizations every year; and,
publishes materials that reach millions, young and old.
NCPC partners with socially responsible corporations to create mutually beneficial
relationships. These corporate citizens enhance national and local crime prevention
efforts and invest in NCPC, the national resource center for crime prevention. Not only
do these companies provide financial resources, they provide management skills, marketing
expertise, and creative synergy to all of NCPC's programs. 
In October of 1994, RadioShack joined forces with NCPC and the National Sheriffs'
Association to form United Against Crime, a public-private alliance which offers a
multi-year, free education program on crime prevention. The partnership is one of the
largest public-private sector crime prevention initiatives ever undertaken and was
formed to empower people to take action that will result in less crime, stronger
families, and more active communities. RadioShack has underwritten the cost of the
alliance's program and is devoting space in each of its 7,200 electronic retail stores to
showcase crime prevention information centers. Since August 1995, RadioShack has provided
resources and introduced quarterly satellite crime prevention trainings for law
enforcement, community leaders, and the public in over 150 sites. United Against Crime
has been recognized by the Public Relations Society of New York with the Big Apple Award
for Community Relations and by the International Association of Business Communications
with the ACE Award for Community Relations.