FREE ESSAY ON CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I

CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I

On June 28, a Serbian student, Gavrilo Princip, spurred Europe into the most catastrophic
event of modern history, assassinating Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand. Yet,
somewhere behind this simple act lies a much deeper and complex origin to a war unlike
any had ever seen or even imagined. Profound improvements in war technology, growing
tensions between neighboring European ethnic groups, and a comprehensive system of
alliances and treaties, which all defined The First World War, resulted in the essential
annihilation of an entire generation of European men and led to an equally devastating
War twenty-five years later. The causes of such, and the appointment of blame, have been
tenaciously argued and re-argued by historians from all perspectives and biases. This
paper will also examine the question of who is to blame for World War I. 
The initial conclusion to the question of responsibility was handed down at the treaty of
Versailles following Germany's signing of the armistice on November 11, of 1918, ending
the War. The treaty placed the blame of the war solely on Germany's shoulders, dealing
her tremendously harsh punishments that ensured severe detriment to Germany's economy,
military and general prestige. This would also lead a shamed Germany into a decade of
despair and finger pointing that would see a radical Adolf Hitler lead his downtrodden
masses into the Second World War. The Versailles treaty, plainly drafted by avaricious
victors seeking exorbitant reparations on the basis of renewed sentiments of hate,
prejudice and blind fury, in no way reflects the true picture of responsibility for World
War I. Though Germany deserves an allotment of the blame, and possibly a greater portion
than any other participant in the war does, certainly there were factors outside of
Germany's control that led to the war. These factors, which find their roots dispersed
throughout a half century's time leading up to the war, include: the establishment of
alliances among the leading powers of Europe, following a history of wars seeking to
maintain a balance of power among these nations; nationalist ideals of unity and ethnic
supremacy; and an inability by the leading statesmen of the time to work out an efficient
and compromising solution to the problem at hand. Ultimately, every major power involved
in the War, and the representatives of those countries, without exception, can be justly
apportioned, to a greater or lesser degree, based on the aforementioned criteria, a part
of the blame.
The calculated system of alliances that determined the sides for World War I were
carefully established in the mid-19th Century to sustain an even balance of power
throughout Europe. Germany's Otto Von Bismarck established these alliances in the
aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. France, soundly defeated, lost territories
in Alsace and Lorraine, as well as being handed heavy war debts, and Bismarck predicted
an eventual attempt by the French to regain their land and integrity. The politically
savvy Bismarck, to prevent any French aggression, organized a triumvirate of leading
European powers, Germany, Austria and Italy, and formed the Triple Alliance in 1891,
effectively isolating France within Europe. This, the most significant of a number of
alliances established by Bismarck with other eastern powers including Russia, also
allowed Germany to mediate and ease tensions as Russia and Austria continually jockeyed
for dominance in the Balkans. Therefore, of the countries that made up the Triple
Alliance, clearly Germany had the greatest influence on the outcome of the events leading
up to World War I.
Opposing Bismarck's Triple Alliance was France, Russia and Great Britain's Triple
Entente. France, who had obvious agitation with Germany, sought to counter the Central
Power's with an alliance of its own. France immediately looked to Russia whom they knew
had a fierce conflict of interest with Austria, Germany's most powerful ally. Russia, who
was experiencing intense domesticate volatility, did not hesitate to join forces with a
reliable French nation. Lacking from the dyad was a third power that could counter
Germany's well-established military forces. England initially remained neutral, as it
sought no defense or expanse of European territories. However, as the late 19th Century
dragged on and Germany continued a frenetic expanse of their navy and began to challenge
Britain's military and economic prowess, England had no choice but to join France and
Russia for England's best interest at home and abroad. Thus, the Triple Entente was
formally established in 1914 and the opposing sides of World War I had taken shape. 
So, what blame if any can be handed down with respect to the establishment of alliances?
For Germany this question is complicated. When one examines the initial intentions of
Bismarck in creating Germany's allies it is clear that Bismarck was solely devoted to the
interest of peace and balance of power. He had the means and support to increase an
already large German Empire but opted for a more tranquil Europe at the expense of land
and economic gains. However, Bismarck's greedy successors, namely Kaiser Wilhelm,
according to most contemporary sources saw the Triple Alliance as a tool to expand the
German Empire. Just prior to the War Germany and the Kaiser maintained its status as a
non-aggressor, saying that Germany, Is ostensibly making every effort to preserve peace
and that Germany is, Ready to mediate for peace with Austria(480). The other side of the
argument of German motive is presented by German historian Immanuel Geiss, who shows that
the Triple Alliance was a German attempt to become a world power, not a world
peacekeeper. Geiss's essential argument is that the Triple Alliance, Was a result of the
German desire to raise the Reich from the status of a continental power to that of a
world power(501). Geiss is quick to note that Germany's ambitious naval program, as well
as its ever-increasing influence in European affairs, as indicators of aggression. Donald
Kagan, another historian, reinforces the points made by Geiss: From the late 1890's
imperial Germany was fundamentally dissatisfied power, eager to disrupt the status quo
and to achieve its expansive goals, by bullying if possible, by war if necessary (520).
The ultimate proof of Germany's ambitious plans are spelled out in the September Program
which was released immediately following the outbreak of war. German historian Fritz
Fischer claims that the September Program had been established well in advance of the war
and that, Germany unleashed the war precisely to achieve its purposes (518). The
provisions of the plan, set in motion by the forming of the Triple Alliance, would
establish Germany as the unequivocal dominant force in European economy and politics.
Germany would seize lands and forge its influence over, France, Belgium, Holland,
Denmark, Austria, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway (519), as stated directly
by the September Program. However, Germany was not the only country who saw the alliances
as a means to advance an empire. France too was possibly guilty of having intentions
other than peace in mind when forming its alliances. Max Monteglas, defending Germany's
innocence, notes that France, Aimed at recovering Alsace Lorraine and also hoped to annex
the Saar Basin (449). He also shows that France, in an aggressive move, Compelled England
to abandon her neutrality before Belgium's neutrality was violated (452). Though
Monteglas's arguments are intriguing, one could easily look at France's ambition to
re-take Alsace Lorraine as justifiable and her eagerness to join with England as a simple
matter of defense against a much stronger Germany. Like France, the nations of Austria,
Russia, England and Italy all could justify their attachment to a particular alliance as
a matter of self-defense against a greater force. Only for Germany did the Triple
Alliance offer the potential to increase an empire and disrupt the stability of European
affairs.
Adding to the brewing chaos in the European situation was the ever-powerful feelings of
ubiquitous nationalism among the competing powers. The Slavic peoples of Russia had deep
sympathy for their ethnic brothers in Serbia and so offered them support. Serbia,
recognizing Russian defense, felt they had the power to question their Austrian rulers
who ignored Serbian demands to liberate their people. Austria, ethnically dissimilar from
the Serbians they governed, looked to a history of German association to counter the
Serbian threat of Russian involvement. Germany, without need of an ally, saw the Austrian
proposal as a means to create a stronger Germany, one that could compete with Europe's
historical powers, France and Britain and the world's up and coming powers, The United
States and Russia. If nothing else, ethnic differences between opposing nations led to
considerable distrust and lack of respect. In a reaction to Serbia's reply to Austria's
demands following the Archduke's assassination, Kaiser Wilhelm went so far as to say, The
Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion (480). This
statement clearly exemplifies the implications of ethnic differences among nations
seeking understanding to avoid conflict. With such attitudes compromise is essentially
impossible. Unfortunately, the Kaiser was not alone in his pre-conceived evaluations of
different peoples. All of Europe can be partly to blame for wild, unfounded assumptions
that only furthered tensions and thus brought Europe that much closer to a world war.
The most significant factors leading up to World War I lie deeper than systematic
alliances or ethnic differences. It was in the month's time between the assassination of
Archduke Ferdinand and Germany's declaration of war on Russia that a world war became
inevitable. June 28 to August 1, saw a complicated series of futile attempts by all sides
to prevent war, or at least that is what they claimed, foiled by bad timing and
ineffective diplomacy.
Austria was the first nation to blunder in effectively dealing with the Archduke's
assassination. Austria's failure was a result of her inaction immediately following the
murder. German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Zimmermann expressed the
consequences of Austrian hesitation: Austria-Hungary failed to act without delay and
under the powerful impression of the Sarejevo murder...This mistake gave he Entente
Powers the welcome chance to exchange views and arrive at an understanding(458).
Zimmermann implied that a localized war, involving exclusively the Balkan region, would
be possible only if Austria took immediate action. Austria itself recognized the need for
immediate action: There should be no time lost in going into action as to take Serbia and
the chancelleries of Europe by surprise(457). This, of course, was not the case. Austria
gave Europe sufficient time to establish political position and Serbia time to establish
sufficient defense. 
The second mistake was a consequence of Russian haste in mobilization and its disapproval
of localized conflict. The German Ambassador to Russia, Pourtales, reported Russia's
stance to the Kaiser on July 25; It would be impossible for Russia to admit that the
Austro-Serb quarrel could be settled by the two parties concerned(469). Clearly Russia
intended on intervention if any Austrian aggression ensued. Though Russia had substantial
ethnic ties to Serbia, it is questionable whether or not Russia was justified in a total
defense against Austrian aggression. It was undeniable that Serbia had challenged the
power of Austria and an Austrian response was expected. Had Russia, as painful as it
might have been, allowed Austria to deal Serbia its punishment than Germany and thus
France and England would have stayed out of any war and localization would have been
achieved. However, once Russia had committed itself to action, France to Russia's defense
and Germany to Austria's were obligated by their respective alliances to also commit
themselves to eventual war. Great Britain, on the other hand, waited until mobilization
by both parties occurred before taking the side of France and Russia. Interestingly, at
one point the Czar reconsidered mobilization but balked due to immense domesticate
pressure to defend Serbia. Pourtales accurately predicted of the Czar's cowardice, saying
on July 30, two nights before war declarations, Frivolity and weakness are to plunge the
world into the most frightful war(487).
The third, and most vital mistake, belongs to Germany. Germany, seemingly determined to
go to war, refused numerous offers and suggestions by primarily England to negotiate with
Austria and Russia to prevent a continental war. After loudly dismissing an English
proposal from Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to convene
as one of four major powers to promote a peaceful end to the increasing tensions in
Europe, Germany also ignored Britain's request to mediate the Balkan conflict. Theobald
von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, recognized the implications of
Germany's refusal to adhere to Great Britain's requests: Since we have already refused
one English proposal for a conference, it is impossible for us to waive a limine this
English suggestion also. By refusing every proposition for mediation, we shall be held
responsible by the conflagration by the whole world, and be set forth as the original
instigators of the war(478). Upon German defeat four years later, the Treaty of
Versailles would be based heavily on these same principles.
Adjacent to Germany's lack of interest in mediation was its vehement support of any
Austrian action. This position by Germany was clearly expressed by Heinrich Leonhard von
Tschirschky, German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, when he relayed to Austria, That
Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin in whatever it might decide
regarding Serbia(460). This statement is hardly a mediative plea for Austrian compromise.
Austrian confidence in this statement was strengthened when Kaiser Wilhelm offered
Austria Carte Blanche, or total support, in its military actions. With Germany standing
strong at its back, Austria was now poised to exercise harsh military punishment on
Serbia that would undoubtedly trigger Russia's and the rest of Europe's involvement. Had
Germany instead used its influence to pacify Austrian aggression and therefore subdue
Russia's fears, then the conflict could have remained localized and a world war could
have been prevented.
It is pure speculation that Germany would have been able to pacify Austria. Austria
seemed intent from the beginning to prove its power over Serbia by harsh militaristic
means. It is even further speculation that in light of a German detachment from the
Balkan conflict that Russia would have followed suit. Russia, seeking the same
nationalistic growth as all of Europe's competing powers, had a history of influence
throughout the Balkan region that offered Russia potentials in economic and political
expansion. Likewise, France's involvement in the affair was not a simple matter of
altruism. France sought to regain lands it had lost to Germany almost fifty years prior
as well as a renewed respect as a world empire. Great Britain, though to all appearances
innocent, selfishly bathed in its content while European tensions heated to a boiling
point. Had Great Britain been clear on its stance from early on, then Germany may have
stepped down as Europe's playground bully.
In light of these arguments one cannot justly apportion blame to a single nation or
person. Rather, it was a collection of nations all seeking economic, military, and
territorial expansion at the expense of anyone who got in their way. Driven by false
ideals of ethnocentrism, all convinced of divine supremacy, the leaders and peoples of
those European nations found themselves spiraling into a half a decade of absolute death
and destruction. Two gunshots by a Serbian nationalist triggered billions more and one
man who killed for his country caused millions to die for theirs. Yet, behind it all lay
a vast and complex political structure that for reasons to be argued about but never
proven, crumbled to the ground and left Europe and the world to question, why? 
Bibliography
world book encyclopedia 1982
max monteglas
luigi albertini