FREE ESSAY ON BAY OF PIGS

BAY OF PIGS

BAY OF PIGS
It seems that the United States has been one of the most dominant, if not the most
dominant, countries in the world, since the Declaration of Independence. Yet, on Monday,
April 17, 1961, our government experienced incredible criticism and extreme embarrassment
when Fidel Castro, dictator of Cuba, instantly stopped an invasion on the Cuban beach
known as the Bay of Pigs. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, his advisors, and many
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials, made the largest error of their political
careers. Once the decision was made to invade Cuba, to end Castro and his Communist
government, Kennedy and his administration were never looked at in the same light nor
trusted again. Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev was affiliated with Castro, and the two
countries made many military decisions together. As Kennedy and the United States tried
to stop Cuba and Russia from becoming a threat to the world, an invasion was planned out
and executed. The results were a disaster. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the largest
military mistake ever made by the United States government and the CIA in the 20th
century and brought America to the brink of war with Cuba and Russia.
The Bay of Pigs invasion was not a quick decision, many hours of meetings and conferences
occurred before President Kennedy gave permission for the attack. President Kennedy was
inaugurated on January 20, 1961, and immediately wanted to take the initiative with the
Soviet and Cuban governments (Pearson 12). Russia was already under Communist control,
and Fidel Castro took over the Cuban government with heavily armed troops and policeman.
Castro's policemen filled the streets, and he ran the newspapers, as well as many
assembly buildings (Frankel 60). At the beginning, Castro did not run a Communist
government, but once he began to meet with Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev, Castro
started a Communist government (Crassweller 23). Max Frankel, writer for the New York
Times, summarizes the situation in Cuba by saying, "Little by little, the vise tightened.
Little by little the free people of Cuba came to realize it could happen there. The grim
facts of life on an island that became a police state" (Frankel 59). Every day, Castro
came closer to controlling every aspect in life in Cuba. Fidel Castro even took control
of the schools in Cuba, throwing out any teacher who he thought might be "disloyal" or
disagreeing with Communism. Castro gave long speeches on television, with colorful
banners flapping, and bands playing music as patrolmen covered the streets (61). 
As Kennedy viewed everything happening politically in Cuba, he began to think of what
America could do to help. Former President Lyndon B. Johnson attended many of the
meetings and helped advise Kennedy in these conferences. After a meeting with Kennedy in
early March in 1961, Johnson told news reporters, "We don't intend to sit here in our
rocking chair with our hands folded and let the Communism set up any government in the
Western Hemisphere" (If U.S. 47). U.S. Senator William Fullbright of Arkansas was
concerned over newspaper stories that predicted an invasion on Cuba (Schlesinger 251). If
anyone in Cuba expected an attack, it would ruin the surprise attack, and the mission
would have less chance for success. Fullbright wanted to let Cuba solve their problems,
as long everything was contained in only Cuba (252). William Fullbright advised Kennedy
and other U.S. leaders, "The Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a
dagger in the heart" (252). Fullbright admitted to the fact that there was a problem in
Cuba, but he did not view Communism as a big problem. Meetings continued through March
and April, and the American people wanted to know if anything was going to be done. On
April 8, Kennedy stated in a news conference, "There will not, under any circumstances,
be an intervention in Cuba by U.S. armed forces" (Flaherty 94). President Kennedy did not
want the American people worrying about events and Cuba, and more importantly, he did not
want Cuba to expect an invasion.
John F. Kennedy debated and thought about what could be done in Cuba. Senator Fullbright
from Arkansas urged Kennedy to hold back from Cuba. Fullbright wanted the U.S. to focus
on the Russian government and resolve problems overseas (Pearson 13). Finally, in
mid-April, Kennedy gave the Central Intelligence Agency permission to invade Cuba.
Kennedy gave the CIA full control of the attack, including when, where, and all the
strategy plans for the invasion. After the decision for the attack was made, meetings
continued in the State Department building where Kennedy and 19 of his advisers made
speeches and voiced their opinions and ideas on Cuba (Schlesinger 252). The exact
location of the attack was a very important decision that had to be decided. The choices
were narrowed down to three beaches, Trinidad, Zapata, and Cochinos Bay. Trinidad and
Zapata were ruled out, because too many civilians lived there and the beachhead wasn't
large enough (253). Finally, after many hours of debating, the CIA decided to attack
Bahia de Cochinos, the Cuban name for the Bay of Pigs (Guido). 
Colonel Jack Hawkins, military planner for the U.S. in 1961, told Kennedy and the CIA,
"Further efforts to develop armed internal resistance, or to organize Cuban exile forces,
should not be made except with a planned overt intervention by United States forces"
(Robinson). Col. Hawkins wanted to use Cuban soldiers who had defected from Castro when
he took over Cuba. Hawkins also wanted every detail considered before an attack was
executed. 1,500 Cuban exiles and 300 U.S. soldiers and frogmen were trained at Puerto
Cabezas, which was code named "Happy Valley" ("The Price"). On April 10, Cuban men began
boarding military boats, and final plans were designed on April 14. The plan was to seize
three beaches along 40 miles of shore, concentrating mainly on the Bay of Pigs.
Paratroopers were supposed to drop to control the shore and destroy Fidel Castro's air
force. The beach was to be controlled for three days, and more troops would come in
behind to take over (Schlesinger 269). The U.S. wanted to bomb Cuban beaches on 3
consecutive days preceding the invasion. The bombing would be done by Cuban pilots in
Cuban planes, so Castro would not expect an invasion from the United States (Schlesinger
270). On Sunday, April 16, 1961, Cuban planes bombed the Bay of Pigs beachhead for the
second day in a row. Castro suspected an attack on Cuba and declared a social revolution,
many Cubans expected an attack to be made, and many parades were held in the streets
(Crassweller 23).
Late Sunday night, on April 16, American frogmen began marking invasion points on the
shore so the planes and troops knew where to attack. As they marked the land, they were
spotted by Cuban guards, who fired several shots in their direction, so they swam back to
their boats (Schlesinger 273). Immediately after daybreak on Monday, April 17, Cuban
paratroopers were dropped down onto the beaches, and the Bay of Pigs invasion began.
Castro's six remaining planes reacted without delay, and sank two battle ships located
near the shore, the Houston and the Rio Escondido ("The Price"). The Houston held all the
ammunition for the next two weeks, and the Rio Escondido carried all communications
equipment needed for a successful attack (Schlesinger 274). 25 year-old Cuban soldier
Zayas Bayan describes how the beginning of the attack occurred by telling news reporters,
"We realized we were standing on reefs. When the next troops followed, we knew we had a
problem" ("The Price"). The attack started off worse than planned, and the bottom sides
of the aluminum boats bought from Sears were punctured on the reefs just below the
surface of the ocean. What the CIA photo analysts believed to be seaweed was actually
coral reef ("The Price"). The coral reef slowed down all invaders, and made them sitting
ducks for the Cuban Army and planes. Not far from shore, two more U.S. carrier ships with
fighter planes on board waited just in case the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff commanded them
to join in the attack. The CIA and the Army didn't know that President Kennedy decided to
end the third air strike ("If U.S." 47). Without this last bombing, Castro's planes
remained, and all the Cuban tanks remained intact. 
At Playa Larga, eighteen miles away from the main beachhead, the Cuban exile invasion
force was having many problems of their own. The fiberglass boats they were using were
ripped on the coral reef, and some of the engines wouldn't start. Lieutenant Erneido
Oliva was in charge of the invasion at Playa Larga. He started the day on the Houston,
and when he saw trouble, he immediately left before the ship was sunk by Castro's air
force ("The Price"). Oliva eventually led his force onto the beach, many of his men were
shot on the way. Finally, early in the evening, Oliva and his men were in the small
village of Palpite, where 1,000 Cuban militiamen met them there. When Oliva described the
battle afterwards, he said, "I call this the night of the heroes. We had three tanks.
They had 40. Castro's artillery shelled us for two or three hours, at least 2,000 rounds"
("The Price") This was the main battle during the entire invasion, and no ground was
gained by the invaders. Soon after this battle, Oliva was forced to return to the
beachhead at Giron, near the Bay of Pigs location. By this time in the evening, nine of
the United States' 16 planes had been shot down and were disabled permanently. Late in
the evening, Oliva decided to regroup everyone. He wanted to run into the Escrambray
Mountains, located about 80 miles away. The CIA leaders in charge of the operation
overrode this decision over the radio, and ordered Oliva to stay. Navy support was
promised to be there as soon as possible to aide Oliva in his attack ("The Price").
However, the Navy never arrived at the beach to participate in the invasion.
As the battle worsened, many of the President's advisers, both military and non-military,
begged for the use of the planes located on the carriers located near the shore ("If
U.S." 47) Kennedy denied the use of these planes, and they remained grounded. The next
afternoon, Oliva and many of the troops were exhausted, and most of them were out of
ammunition. Oliva radioed into the CIA, located on a Navy ship several miles from the
battle, screaming, "We have nothing left to fight with! How can you people do this to us,
our people, our country?" Grayston Lynch, CIA person in charge replied, "I'm sorry, and
good luck" ("The Price"). The CIA was abandoning the soldiers on the shore completely.
"Pepe" Perez San Roman, commander of the Brigade 2506, radioed into the U.S. Navy
destroyers, yelling, "How do these people expect me to defend the beach with no air
force, no artillery, and no antiaircraft guns? I'm a military man, not a magician" ("The
Price"). Commander San Roman felt he did not have the proper equipment and personnel for
a successful invasion. 
Meanwhile, during the fighting on the shore, Castro's police arrested 2,000 Cubans who
might have joined the invaders and caused an uprising (Flaherty 93). Once Castro expected
an invasion, he kept a close eye on anyone who might have defected and joined the United
States. Part of the original plan by the CIA assumed Oliva and his men would seize the
beachhead at Playa Larga, where volunteers and defectors from Castro were to join them
and help fight. The arrested Cubans were collected into auditoriums and theaters in the
cities. Anyone who was expected to be in underground connections was taken into custody.
The Cuban Revolution Council, a group of Cuban citizens who were against Castro and
Communism, went into hiding early on Sunday, before the invasion took place (Schlesinger
274). On Monday and Tuesday, Kennedy held meetings in the White House. Kennedy and his
advisers were very concerned about the members of the Brigade and the other invaders.
Kennedy, however, refused to send in the Marines (Schlesinger 276). However, officials
still refused to let the American people know there was an invasion. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, during a press conference stated:
"The American people are entitled to know whether we are intervening in Cuba or intend to
do so in the future. The answer to that question is no. What happens in Cuba is for the
Cuban people to decide." (275)
Not only did American leaders hold back information from the public, but they lied about
the entire thing even happening. Even while the invasion was taking place, the CIA and
Kennedy denied that anything was happening outside of the United States. On Tuesday
morning, San Roman and Oliva gathered their troops, and abandoned the entire invasion.
All members of the invasion, both American and Cuban returned back to the ships, and
returned to the United States. 
Everyone has their own opinions on the reasons for the failure at the Bay of Pigs. Many
people believe we never should have tried to invade Cuba. The CIA investigated the Bay of
Pigs shortly after the incident, but their report has never been published. This report
was written by General Maxwell Taylor, who later became Joint Chief of Staff; Allen
Dulles, director of CIA who planned and supervised the attack; Admiral Arleigh Burke,
Chief of Naval Operations; Attorney General Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy's brother
(Flaherty 92). However, this report remains locked in a safe owned by the CIA, and
contains important information never released to the public. John F. Kennedy believed
that the entire operations failed because of many miscalculations:
1) Not sending enough troops for the invasion
2) Assuming the B-26 air attack would provide air cover and support
3) Assuming the landing would be a surprise
4) Assuming that the troops could go into the hills and fight if anything went wrong on 
the beach (Flaherty 92)
The CIA and Cuban exiles pointed their fingers back at Kennedy, and blamed him for his
failure to approve air strikes that would have made the attack much easier ("Bay of").
The White House concluded in its own report, "The President listened to bad advice, and
failed to spot all of the errors in advance" (Flaherty 92). Yet another error made was
the miscalculation of Castro's power. Castro was much more powerful than expected, and
his planes took off at the first possible moment. Castro's police eliminated anyone who
might have defected, and his soldiers stood their ground, and fought to win (Schlesinger
293). Castro and his forces acted perfectly, and stopped the invasion before it even had
a chance to start. Castro and his forces killed 200 rebel soldiers, and captured 1,197
men ("Bay of"). Fidel Castro held a mass trial for the men who were captured, and each
was sentenced to 30 years in prison. After 20 months in of negotiations, the prisoners
were sold back to the U.S. in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine. Tom
Flaherty, writer for Life Magazine concluded:
"It has been, and it will be argued for years, that there is at least a part of the truth
in the differing points of view of all who played a part in the debacle. But the largest
and most important truth springs from the disputable facts. The men of Brigade 2506
believed, until the end, that the United States would not let their invasion fail. They
were wrong." (Flaherty 94)
In conclusion, the Bay of Pigs has many unanswered questions. There are many facts stored
in the CIA building that the public will never know. Kennedy and the CIA made many
mistakes. They did not expect Castro to react so quickly, they figured the attack would
be a surprise, they assumed many Cubans would defect from Castro, and help the U.S.
fight. The undisputed fact is that the U.S. lost the battle at the Bay of Pigs. Nothing
was gained, and nearly brought the U.S. into war with Cuba and its ally, Russia. After
nearly 40 years, the Bay of Pigs remains the largest mistake made by United States
officials.
Bibliography
WORKS CITED
"Bay of Blunders." Savannah Now. 1998. 10 April 2000 
Crassweller, Robert D. Cuba and the U.S.: The Tangled Relationship. New York: The 
Foreign Policy Association, 1971.
Flaherty, Tom. "What We Learned from the Bay of Pigs." Reader's Digest July 1963: 92-94.
Frankel, Max. "Cuba - A Case of Communist Take-Over." The New York Times Magazine 
July 1961: 59-64
Guido, Jessica. "The Invasion and the Failure." The Invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.
1999. 
11 April 2000 .
"If U.S. Had Used Its Power at the Bay of Pigs." U.S. News and World Report. 17 May 1965:

47.
Pearson, Drew. "Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Cuba." Saturday Review 29 March 1969: 12-16.
"The Price of Military Folly." U.S. News Online. 1996. 10 April 2000 .
Robinson, Linda. "What Didn't We Do to Get Rid of Castro?" U.S. News Online. 1996. 10 
April 2000 .
Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.