FREE ESSAY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:COGNITIVE ABILITY OF INFORMATION PROCESSING?

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:COGNITIVE ABILITY OF INFORMATION PROCESSING?

Artificial Intelligence: Cognitive Ability or Information Processing
Computers have become an integral part of our everyday lives. We rely upon these machines
to perform innumerable tasks that we often take for granted. Most people realize that
computers are able to perform the multitude of functions as a consequence of the
programming they receive. These programs give computers a set of instructions that
governs their transition from one information processing state to another. Thus,
computational machines are able to respond to a certain set of inputs with a certain
range of outputs. In order to comprehend programs one needs only to describe these
instructions in functional terms. In this regard, computer programs are extremely similar
to functional accounts of the human mind, which contend that in order to understand the
mind, one must simply examine the relationship between stimulus and behavior.
Consequently, the question has naturally arisen as to whether a computer which consisted
of a sufficiently sophisticated program would be capable of thought. This question has
resulted in lively debate, with one camp of people including John R. Searle emphatically
denying the plausibility of Artificial Intelligence. On the other side of the debate,
individuals such as Paul and Patricia Churchland have declared that although a serial
machine with a program might not be able to think, Artificial Intelligence might be
feasible in parallel processing computers. 
In " Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program, " John R. Searle presents an interesting
argument against strong artificial intelligence proponents. Believers of strong
artificial intelligence contend that a computer that can pass the Turing test is
displaying cognitive ability. The Turing test basically states that if a computer can
function in such a way that an expert can not distinguish its performance from that of a
human who has a certain cognitive ability, such as the ability to understand a language,
then the computer also has that ability. Proponents of weak artificial intelligence have
a much less forceful view which states that if a computer can pass the Turing test it is
merely a successful model of the mind. In his essay, it is the strong AI proponents whom
Searle is critiquing. Searle's argument against artificial intelligence can essentially
be summed up in three simple statements: (1) Computer programs are formal/syntactic (2)
Human minds have mental contents or semantics (3) Syntax by itself is neither
constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. From these three statements Searle
concludes that, " Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds." 
In order to illustrate his argument, Searle then utilizes the so called "Chinese room"
argument. The Chinese room simulation commences with a person who has no knowledge of the
Chinese language. This person is then placed into a room containing baskets full of
Chinese symbols. In addition, this individual is provided with a rule book (in a language
which he or she presumably understands) for matching Chinese symbols with other Chinese
symbols. The rules identify these characters solely in terms of their shapes and do not
require any comprehension of them. The argument then asks that you imagine that there are
people outside the room who understand Chinese and who hand this person symbols which
pose certain questions. In response, this person manipulates these symbols according to
the provided rule book, and hands back certain symbols. The symbols that this individual
returns, unknown to the person inside the room, are answers to the questions which these
native Chinese speakers are posing. Furthermore, this rule book makes this person's
answers indistinguishable from a native Chinese speaker's. Hence, this individual would
be able to satisfy the Turing test for comprehension of the Chinese language, although he
does not actually have any understanding of the language. Searle then makes the analogy
between the rule book and a computer program, the person and the computer, and the
symbols and a computer's data base to "decisively" demonstrate that symbol manipulating
devices are not enough for cognition. 
In Searle's opinion, computers can never be minds because they are inherently different
from brains. He argues that brains do not merely instantiate a program but also cause
mental events by virtue of specific neuro - biological processes. Searle is essentially
making the contention that brains, by virtue of their specific biochemical properties,
cause minds. Consequently, according to Searle, any artifact that produced mental
phenomena would have to be able to duplicate the specific causal powers of brains and it
could not do that just by running a formal computer program. 
Although it is interesting to contemplate, Searle's argument definitely has its share of
flaws. The Churchlands, as proponents in the possibility of artificial intelligence to
duplicate the mind, (yet not believers of strong AI as it was previously defined ) do
their best to illustrate these weaknesses in his theory. The primary objection which they
have with Searle's argument against the plausibility of artificial intelligence lies with
the third premise in his original proof. The Churchlands argue that this premise, which
states, "Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics," is an
assumption rather than a fact. Additionally, they contend that to assume its truth is
tantamount to "begging the question" against classical AI. Classical AI rests on the
premise that if one can set in motion an appropriately structured interaction of
syntactic elements, correctly connected to a system of inputs and outputs, it can produce
the same cognitive states found in human beings. In essence, Searle is simply assuming
that this theory is not accurate. 
In order to demonstrate this, the Churchlands compare the Chinese room argument with the
luminous room argument. The luminous room argument seemingly decisively rebukes James
Maxwell's 1864 posit that light and electromagnetic waves are identical (A fact which is
now known to be true). This proof is structured to be similar to the Chinese room
argument, and thus also has three basic premises: (1) Electricity and magnetism are
forces (2) The essential property of light is luminance (3) Forces by themselves are
neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for luminance. The conclusion that can be reached
following this set of premises is that electricity and magnetism are neither constitutive
of nor sufficient for light. To demonstrate this, believers in this false conclusion
could place an individual in a darkened room, and have him move a magnet up and down.
When the magnet, which releases electromagnetic waves, fails to produce light opponents
of Maxwell's theory could then use this as evidence to assert the validity of their
erroneous conclusion and claim victory. 
Nonetheless, absurd as this conclusion may appear now, the Churchlands point out that
during the 19th century, when the scientific community did not appreciate the systematic
parallels between the properties of light and of electromagnetic waves, this argument
could have served as a compelling rebuttal to Maxwell's hypothesis. Furthermore, Maxwell
himself would have had difficulty trying to refute this conclusion. He could have argued
that the magnet was moving at an extremely low rate of oscillation, yet critics could
counter that the rate of oscillation was irrelevant, and that all that was need to create
light according to his theory was present in the darkened room. Maxwell might then make
the seemingly ridiculous assertion that the room in fact is bathed with light, yet this
tacit would probably have elicited the response that it is obvious to any person that the
room is pitch black. This would leave Maxwell with only three methods by which to refute
the argument. He could insist that premise three of his detractors argument was false,
that the luminous room argument demonstrated nothing about the nature of light, and that
an ongoing research program which investigated the relationship between of both these
phenomena was required in order to settle the dispute. 
In the same manner, a proponent of artificial intelligence would then have only three
similar arguments to respond to Searle's theory. He could argue that Searle is not in a
position to insist that rule governed symbol manipulation can never constitute semantic
phenomena and that the Chinese room experiment demonstrated nothing about the nature of
mind. Additionally, he could contend that semantic and cognitive phenomena have yet to be
explained and that Searle exploits our ignorance of these phenomena to prove his
argument. 
The Churchlands then attempt to justify their own theory regarding how artificial
intelligence might be possible. They assert that presently existing computers are not
capable of cognitive ability as a result of the serial manner in which they process
information. Instead, they contend that parallel processing computers, which process data
in a similar manner as the human mind, might one day be able to exhibit cognition. They
arrive at this conclusion for a number of reasons. First, the Chuchlands feel that a
parallel processing system would offer a dramatic speed advantage over conventional
computers. Second, they believe the parallel nature of the system makes it more fault
tolerant and functionally persistent. Finally, the Chuchlands contend that a parallel
system would be able to store large amounts of information in a distributed fashion,
which could be accessed quickly. They argue that these three characteristics might one
day make it possible to create a machine sophisticated enough to exhibit cognition.
Furthermore, this parallel machine would not be manipulating symbols according to
structure sensitive rules. Rather, the Churchlands argue, symbol manipulation would be
just one of the many cognitive skills that this system might learn to display.
Accordingly, rule-governed symbol manipulation would not be this system's basic mode of
operation and it would consequently be free of the Chinese room argument2. 
Both of these hypotheses regarding artificial intelligence are extremely interesting.
Each of them forces us to evaluate exactly what our conceptions are regarding the human
mind and our ability to comprehend it. Perhaps a time will come when mankind will unlock
the door to the mystery of human cognition. Yet, even if we do not, coming to a complete
understanding of the mind is not what is relevant, rather learning more about ourselves
is what is truly important.
1. By making this assertion, Searle is basically arguing against the plausibility of an
artificial intelligence system since it would have to have the causal powers of a brain.
In order to have these causal powers, Searle maintains that this system would require
biochemical elements. Therefore, according to this definition Searle is allowing for the
possibility of artificial intelligence. Recognizing this, the Churchlands attack the
second portion of his assertion concerning biochemical properties, arguing that this
statement is much too strong since not enough is known about cognition to contend that a
biochemical structure is required. The Churchlands feel that a machine might be able to
use something other than biochemical structures to achieve consciousness (parallel
processing). 
2. Searle does have a response to this parallel processing hypothesis. In essence he
proposes the idea of the Chinese gymnasium, in which he organizes people into a parallel
network. From there he returns to the same argument he made previously and states that
these people still do not understand Chinese. Yet the Churchlands respond by saying that
(a) the individual neurons of the brain do not understand English and (b) Searle neglects
to mention that an enormous amount of people would be required for this simulation. Thus,
they argue that a slow, oddly made, functional brain might exist if one could create a
situation with enough people who were organized correctly. They recognize that there is
no guarantee that its activity would constitute real thought, since the theory they are
utilizing positing how the brain functions might not prove to be correct. However, they
feel that if this theory is proven to be correct, it would be likely that this simulation
would have cognitive ability.