FREE ESSAY ON A UNIVERSAL PERSPECTIVE ON BELIEF:

A UNIVERSAL PERSPECTIVE ON BELIEF:

A Universal Perspective on Belief:
A Response to Pragmatic and Cartesian Approaches to Epistemology
By Britta Rempel
(*note to reader:I hope this gives all of you struggling with some concepts in Intro to
Philosophy a clearer view on how to approach your own paper, please do not plagerise)
The approaches given by Pierce and Nagel to the epistemological questions of doubt and
belief, though diverse in that they are strictly pragmatist and Cartesian, contain a
similar underlying principle. They both serve to show that belief cannot come from any
source that appeals to one's feelings or purposes, experiences or impressions. Beliefs
must arise from a non-personal means. Although this is a commonality between the two
approaches in epistemology, they are greatly different arguments in their focuses.
Pierce's pragmatist approach surfaces along the lines of techniques people use to found
their beliefs of reality, here assuming reality from the start, and using that as a
foundation to delve into questions of the unknown. Nagel's look at the Cartesian approach
primarily doubts reality, and uses that as the grounds for the rest of his argument,
asking how we can know anything beyond ourselves. These approaches lead to very different
views on epistemology. 
Pragmatism: Pierce's Approach to Epistemology
Pierce's approach to his "epistemological questions" of doubt and belief is solely
pragmatic in nature, in that he states beliefs are established in habits, which reoccur
in our determining of our actions; doubt, on the other hand, is an uneasy state we want
to release ourselves from, to come to a belief (46). We then gather from this, that doubt
and belief have "positive effects" on us, both causing us to act. Pierce begins his
approach with a discussion of the "irritation of doubt"(46). This he describes as an
"immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief" (46). Once this belief is attained,
we are entirely satisfied because our opinion is satisfied, which is, as Pierce states,
the "sole end of inquiry" (47). Pierce then goes on to pragmatically examine the question
of belief and doubt through four "methods". The first is his "method of tenacity", which
denotes believing any answers we like, and considering everything that is in accordance
with that belief, while rejecting all that disrupts our belief (47). It is a process of
coming to beliefs that is "deliberately" adopted, to give one the feeling of satisfaction
and stability, which "yields great peace of mind" (48). Pierce refutes this method,
showing that it is unable to "hold its ground" in a society where people hold contrary
beliefs, because this will inevitably shake ones confidence in their own beliefs: "we
shall necessarily influence each other's opinions" (48). Pierce then leads us to the
"method of authority", which states that the "will of the state" acts as the will of the
individual (49). In this method, the institution of the state keeps its people informed
of "correct doctrines", and teaches them to the young (the institution here having the
power to choose what beliefs are held, and which are suppressed). It forces the
individual into ignorance and suppression of their own doubts and beliefs, segregating
them from "the influence of the rest of the world" (49). This method has been held
throughout history through society and religion, showing results of greater success then
the method of tenacity. Pierce refutes this method of "intellectual" slavery by stating
that, while the institution can regulate opinions on important matters, the "rest of
men's minds must be left to the action of natural causes" (50). This leads him into the
"a priori method", in which we believe what "we find ourselves inclined to believe"; an
impulse to believe in propositions as well as a decision on what "proposition" is to be
believed (50). This method is mainly adopted because one's propositions appear "agreeable
to reason": "Men's opinions will soon lead them to rest on preferences of a far more
universal nature." (51). This theory is refuted much as the method of authority. Once one
sees that a belief of theirs is determined by a social custom or "circumstance extraneous
to the facts", one must experience a real doubt, ceasing their belief (51). The "method
of science" is presented last, being the method in which our beliefs are caused by
something outside ourselves, and our thinking: some thing permanent. It is not
individual, but must affect everyone in order to be permanent. This method assumes
reality outside of our perception; everything is real, and governed by certain laws
regardless of our "opinions about them" (52). No doubts arise from the practice of this
method, the social impulse does not give cause to doubt it. We only cease to use science
when we don not know how to apply it, and it has had the "most wonderful triumphs in the
way of settling opinion" (52). For these four reasons, Pierce chooses to contrast the
method of science with the others. He goes on to establish this method by saying it is
the only one giving a distinction between right and wrong way; it is possible for bad and
good reasoning to happen, which Pierce claims is the "foundation of the practical side of
logic" (53). 
Skepticism: Nagel's Approach to Cartesian Epistemology
Nagel's approach is Cartesian in nature; it assumes skepticism in that he states that
one's own consciousness is the only thing one can be sure of. Everything one believes is
based on their "experiences and thoughts, feelings and sense impressions" (8). Everything
outside of one's own, personal thoughts can only access them by means of these "inner
experiences and thoughts" (8). Nagel points out that we are aware of reality directly,
but we can only comment on the "external world" in view of our relation to it. By
appealing to your "impressions" in trying to prove their validity, you are, what Nagel
calls, "arguing in a circle" (9), or making a claim about something using that something
as your source. He claims that one then, cannot rely on things inside the mind to prove
what is outside the mind (10). The "most radical conclusion" he alleges we can draw from
this, is solipsism: the only thing that one can know exists is one's mind (or conception
of it) (11). This is, of course, Descartes' main theory, methodological skepticism,
encapsulated in his infamous statement "I think therefore I exist". Basically, the
skepticism lies in the actuality that most of the comparisons it makes between cannabis
and alcohol, the illegal drug comes out better--or at least on a par--with the legal one.

The report concludes, for example, that in developed societies cannabis appears to play
little role in injuries caused by violence, as does alcohol. It also says that while the
evidence for fetal alcohol syndrome is good, the evidence that cannabis can harm fetal
development is far from conclusive. 
Cannabis also fared better in five out of seven comparisons of long-term damage to
health. For example, the report says that while heavy consumption of either drug can lead
to dependence, only alcohol produces a well defined withdrawal syndrome. And while heavy
drinking leads to cirrhosis, severe brain injury and a much increased risk of accidents
and suicide, the report concludes that there is only suggestive evidence that chronic
cannabis use may produce subtle defects in cognitive functioning. 
Two comparisons were more equivocal. The report says that both heavy drinki8221;, we
cannot exceed it, therefore, we end up "arguing in circles" (17). Although with Nagel, we
are still left with many, more specific questions, we are left with the statement that "a
belief in the world outside our minds comes so naturally to us, perhaps we don't need
grounds for it." (18). This is the rational conclusion we are left with: perhaps it is
better to continue believing reality is reliable, for it is "practically impossible" not
to (17). 
Commonalities and Contrasts of Pierce and Nagel 
The contrast between these two works is obvious, although they do contain some
similarities in the things conclude. Pierce's theory assumes reality while Nagel's, or
rather Descartes' theory, doubts it. This is the main contrast of the two theories, since
the veracity of reality is the underlying idea in both works. While the pragmatist
approach assumes science as the only method presenting "any distinction of a right and
wrong way" (Pierce 52), the Cartesian approach assumes nothing beyond the mind, science
just being another set of observations on a reality that we can never "observe directly"
(Nagel 14). Every method of coming to a belief that Pierce presents, assumes a reality,
yet explores virtually nothing of the nature of reality. In Pierce's final discussion of
the method of science, he assumes the reliability of facts, the same facts Nagel refutes
through the beginning of his argument. The pragmatists' approach starts with "known and
observed facts to proceed to the unknown" (Pierce 53), whereas the Cartesian approach
begins assuming the unknown, and proceeds to try and verify the reality of these "know
and observed facts". In this sense, it seems Nagel's Cartesian approach is far more
metaphysical in nature; it serves to deal with knowledge in terms of our experience of
our reality. Pieces' pragmatist approach is far more epistemological in that it delves
into the nature of our knowledge: the origins of our beliefs. To compare the two
approaches under the same category of epistemology though, one could classify Pierce's
pragmatism under the school of rationalism, in that he deals with structures of reason in
his rationalizing, while Nagel's Cartesian approach could be classified into the school
of empiricism, as his rationalizing deal mainly with the reality of sense perception. The
two approaches do both arrive at one of the same conclusions, which is they both
acknowledge a need for a distinction of a "right and wrong way" (Pierce 52). There must
be right and wrong ways to know a belief, or to know a reality, that do not "appeal to
[one's] feelings and purposes" (Pierce 53). Pierce ends at the conclusion of the
scientific method, in that the first three are refutable because of their appeal to a
"personal" aspect of belief. Nagel refutes claims about beliefs about the external world
because they all rely on an appeal to personal "experiences and thoughts, feelings and
sense impressions" (Nagel 8). In this sense, the two theories want to assume that there
is more to belief than the reasoning of the individual, that belief is something
transcendent, even universal. There must be some universal veracity to knowledge and
belief. Though the views presented are diverse in their epistemological natures, this
fundamental view remains held by both philosophers. 
Pierce's paper gives us a look into the pragmatic nature of epistemology, a very
practical approach on how we come to a belief. Nagel reviews the Cartesian approach to
epistemology, showing us the unreliability in assuming a reality apart from ourselves.
How we can come to any sort of belief on anything is questioned in both works, yet in
taking completely different approaches, they delve into the complete realm of knowledge.
The cohesion between the two approaches is purely that they refute a personal or
exclusive method in determining one's beliefs. Beliefs must be universal, transcendent of
the individual. 
Bibliography
Bibliography
Thomas Nagel, What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy. New York,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief"; Popular Science Monthly 12 (November
1877), 46-53.
John Cottingham, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992.